in the complete absence of recollection. What is required to settle the open questions is an experimental approach that yields high confidence familiarity ratings similar in strength to high confidence recollection ratings that would permit distinguishing separate processes. Under those conditions, a single-process model would predict that familiarity and recollection ratings would be highly correlated and would exhibit a positive linear relationship both in the perirhinal cortex and hippocampus. In contrast, a dual-process model would predict that familiarity and recollection ratings could be decoupled and that familiarity ratings would be positively correlated with activity in the perirhinal cortex and recollection ratings would be positively correlated with hippocampal activity. Until these issues are addressed, a converging view in the field is unlikely to emerge.
In this issue of Neuron, Haskins et al. and Shrager et al. challenge accepted notions about recognition memory and provide us with new insight into old questions. Though the two papers come to different conclusions, they nevertheless advance our understanding of the MTL memory system. Whether or not the perirhinal cortex and hippocampus differentially support familiarity and recollection, it is an important fact that both of these regions interact to collectively determine memory confidence. Likewise, it is significant that familiarity may derive from bound associations, beyond the familiarity associated with each component, and that this function can be tied to the perirhinal cortex. All indications are that the next decade will produce important advances in our understanding of the neural bases of recognition memory. With apologies to Dorothy Parker, we must admit that it is possible to teach an old dogma new tricks.
An important question in neuroeconomics is how consciousness affects decision making. In this issue of Neuron, Pessiglione et al. take an initial step toward addressing this question by showing that humans learn to make optimal choices in the absence of explicit knowledge about key parameters of the decision-making problem.
To the neuroeconomist, animals' brains evolved to be sophisticated and effective decision-making machines. This view stems from the fact that an animal that does not make good choices is less likely to have fit offspring, which significantly decreases the chances that its genes will survive the pressures of Darwinian competition. From this perspective, brain function can be understood in terms of how it helps organisms to make better decisions. An application of this logic suggests, for example, that the nervous system has evolved perceptual capabilities that are valuable for decision making (e.g., color vision allows animals to make finer distinctions between potential food sources) and that cognitive features like declarative memory enhance our ability to make sound choices (e.g., remembering previous bad outcomes in similar choice situations helps us to avoid making similar mistakes). This leads to two important open questions: How does consciousness improve decision making? How does it change the computations that the brain engages in making a decision?
In order to think about these questions, it is useful to have a small conceptual framework describing a simple decisionmaking situation and the computations that the brain needs to implement to make a good choice (for a review, see Rangel et al., 2008) . To keep things concrete, consider the problem of a rat that needs to decide whether or not to press a lever. This is an important decision for the rat because it has consequences: sometimes pressing the lever leads to a tasty food pellet, at other times it leads to an unpleasant foot shock. The simple world of the rat can be summarized by a small number of variables. First is the state of the world, denoted by s, which describes the type of situation that the rat is currently in. Second is the set of potential outcomes that may follow the lever press, in this simple example o = food, shock. Third are probability functions describing the likelihood of the different outcomes as a function of the action (denoted by p(ojL,s) and p(ojNL,s) with L = press and NL = no press). Note that the probability of the two outcomes depends on the state of the world. For example, the rat might only get shocks when experimenter A is in the room (one state of the world) and only pellets with experimenter B (another state of the world). Finally, there is the amount of reward generated by the outcome that actually occurs.
What are the computations required to make good decisions? At the time of choice, the rat needs to compute a value for both actions that is equal to the expected reward that they generate and then choose the action with the highest value. These values forecasts, often called decision values, are denoted by V(Ljs) and V(NLjs). For simplicity assume that V(NLjs) = 0 so that the optimal action for the rat is to press the lever if and only if V(Ljs) > 0. Note, importantly, that this value, and thus the optimal decision, depends on the state of the world. For example, the optimal decision is to press the lever with experimenter B and not to do it with experimenter A. If follows that in order to assign the right value to the lever press, the rat must also know, consciously or unconsciously, the state of the world. Finally, there is the issue of how to learn the value V(Ljs). A growing consensus in the neuroeconomics literature is that reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms nicely describe the learning process (for a review, see Niv and Montague, 2008) . The idea behind these algorithms is simple: the rat learns the value V(Ljs) by computing a prediction error (PE) that measures the difference between the reward obtained and the reward expected in the current state of the world, which is then added to the value estimate for the current state of the world. It can be shown that these algorithms quickly converge to the true decision values under a very wide range of circumstances (Sutton and Barto, 1998) . A large number of studies have shown that a PE signal seems to be encoded in the firing of dopamine neurons into the ventral striatum (for a review, see Balleine et al., 2008) .
To understand the role of consciousness in decision making, we need to understand how it changes these computations. Pessiglione et al. (2008) in this issue of Neuron have taken an initial step by studying humans with functional magnetic resonance imaging during an analog of our rat problem in which individuals do not have explicit knowledge of the state of the world. Subjects were asked to decide whether or not to play a lottery that pays +1, 0, or À1 pounds as outcomes. The lottery always pays +1 in state 1, 0 in state 2, and À1 in state 3. The decision-making problem is not trivial, however, because the state of the world is announced to the subjects through the presentation of a ''fractal stimulus'' using a visual backward masking procedure which ensures subliminal, but not supraliminal recognition. Note that this experiment elegantly captures a situation that is pervasive in real-life decision making since, given the limited band-width of consciousness, we are aware of only a small fraction of the stimuli that affect the mapping from actions to outcome probabilities.
The authors asked two basic questions. First, can subjects learn to make the right decision in each state of the world? The answer is yes. With repeated experience, subjects learned to play the lottery about 65% in the good state but only about 35% in the bad state. This finding is interesting because it suggests that conscious awareness of the state is not necessary for making the decision values contingent on that state. Second, does the brain encode the PE signal that is critical to learning to estimate the value of taking decisions? The authors found a strong PE signal in the ventral striatum that resembles the one that has been found in countless previous studies using only supraliminal stimuli. This finding is also quite interesting because it suggests that RL computations can take place in the absence of conscious awareness of the state of the world.
It is important to emphasize that these findings do not imply that consciousness is not beneficial for decision making. As the authors themselves recognize, had subjects been aware of the state of the world, they would have learned to implement the optimal rule 100% within a handful of trials, which is in fact what was found in a closely related study (Pessiglione et al., 2006) . This paper begins a rich research agenda for neuroeconomics. A natural next step is to study if subjects can learn to take the optimal action when they do not have explicit knowledge of the outcomes (for example, if monetary prizes are presented subliminally in a way analogous to the current experiment). However, the most interesting (and challenging) experiments will study how conscious knowledge of the parameters of the decision-making situation alter the basic computations described above. Examples of the questions that need to be asked include the following: how are declarative memories of the outcome of previous decisions integrated with RL computations to generate a decision value? How does conscious awareness of the state of the world and the outcome generated by an action alter the computed prediction errors? In fact, given that as a neuroeconomist I view the brain essentially as a decision-making machine, I believe that these studies will not only improve our understanding of the neurobiological and computational basis of choice, but will also provide invaluable insights into the nature of consciousness.
Increasing the amount of physical activity has been observed to ameliorate the progression of Alzheimer's disease (AD), as well as enhance neurogenesis. Choi et al. in this issue of Neuron report that the expression of Presenilin 1 (PS1) variants, responsible for the early onset of familial AD, are capable of mitigating the regenerative effects associated with increased activity and environmental enrichment likely through changes in resident microglia and their secreted factors.
Normal aging in humans brings with it a progressive loss in memory and other cognitive functions and is often exacerbated by diseases such as AD. Creating hope that this bleak outlook can be challenged, a growing number of studies suggest that increasing the amount of physical activity can reduce the risk and slow the progression of AD (Larson et al., 2006; Pope et al., 2003) . Equally fascinating have been reports in rodents that during normal aging as well as in young adults, increased activity and environmental enrichment (EE) can lead to an increase in the number, and functional output, of neural stem cell populations in the brain (van Praag et al., 2005) . While the parallels between the human and rodent studies are intriguing, more work is necessary to causally link EE and physical activity with increased neurogenesis and cognitive function in experimental models and demonstrate its relevance to humans. In this issue of Neuron, Choi et al. (2008) add a number of unexpected findings to our understanding of EE-induced neurogenesis that might have relevance for aging and possibly AD. They report that PS1 variants causing early-onset familial AD alter the neurogenic niche in the adult mouse brain through changes in microglia that spoil the regenerative benefits associated with increased physical activity and EE.
Stem cells in the adult brain have been observed in mammals, including humans, primarily in the subventricular zone (SVZ) of the lateral ventricles and the subgranular zone (SGZ) of the hippocampus (Lois and Alvarez-Buylla, 1993) . Adult neural stem/progenitor cells (NPCs) are a relatively quiescent population that can selfrenew and give rise to more rapidly dividing progenitors that in turn produce neurons (neurogenesis), as well as astrocytes and oligodendrocytes (gliogenesis). Neurons born in the SGZ can become granule neurons that integrate into the existing circuitry of the hippocampus and have been shown increasingly to influence learning and memory (Dupret et al., 2007) . Previous studies have also established that adult NPCs are localized to specialized microenvironments-or neurogenic niches-composed of surrounding cells including astrocytes, oligodendrocytes, microglia, and endothelial cells, as well as soluble factors, membrane-bound molecule,s and extracellular matrix molecules. Together, the neurogenic niche is thought to provide the permissive cues necessary for NPC maintenance, differentiation, and neural integration into the circuitry of the brain (Alvarez- Buylla and Lim, 2004) .
The promise that increased neurogenesis in the adult brain could indeed stimulate cognitive performance and that EE or physical activity may be sufficient to trigger neurogenesis opened the questions whether adult neurogenesis is impaired in illnesses with cognitive dysfunction such as AD, but also whether EE could be exploited to stave off age-related cognitive decline and neurodegeneration. To date, proteins involved in the early-onset genetic forms of AD, including mutant amyloid precursor protein (APP) and PS1, have been reported to interfere with NPC function in a number of mouse models, both under normal and enriched conditions (Kuhn et al., 2007) . Of special relevance to the current article, Feng et al. (2001) have shown that targeted deletion of endogenous PS1 in excitatory forebrain neurons in adult mice inhibits enrichment-induced neurogenesis in the dentate gyrus and also leads to changes in contextual fear memory functions. This earlier study suggested a
